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By Edward S. Knotek II and Shujaat Khan
E
conomic disruptions generally coincide with heightened uncer-
tainty. In the United States, uncertainty increased sharply with 
the recent housing market crash, financial crisis, deep recession, 
and uneven recovery. In July 2010 congressional testimony, Federal Re-
serve Chairman Bernanke described conditions as “unusually uncer-
tain.” The uncertain landscape was also cited as a factor in the slow 
recovery from the 2001 recession, when the March 2003 Federal Open 
Market Committee statement highlighted the “unusually large uncer-
tainties” at the time.
Uncertainty is a standard feature of most macroeconomic models, 
in which consumers and firms make decisions today based on expec-
tations of an unknown (and hence uncertain) future. But in light of 
real-world events, economists have begun to think more critically about 
the role of uncertainty in the economy. Recent research has allowed the 
degree of uncertainty to vary over time and examined how these fluc-
tuations affect business activity. The results have been mixed thus far, 
with some authors finding that fluctuations in uncertainty are a key fac-
tor in the business cycle, while others have found little such evidence.
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This article takes a similar approach in studying levels of uncertainty 
that can vary over time, but it focuses on household responses to changes 
in uncertainty. Because uncertainty can take many forms, the article con-
siders two measures of uncertainty: one based on references to uncer-
tainty in newspaper articles and another derived from the stock market. 
While economic theory predicts sudden, sharp pullbacks of house-
hold purchases following increases in uncertainty, the empirical results 
suggest that household spending reductions are modest and may only 
appear after a considerable time has passed. In addition, movements 
in uncertainty account for only a small portion of the total fluctua-
tions in household spending. These results suggest that variations in the 
amount of uncertainty—at least as they are commonly captured—do 
not appear to be a key factor driving household spending decisions and, 
in turn, economic weakness. 
The first section of this article provides a framework for think-
ing about uncertainty and how it affects economic activity. The second 
section describes two separate measures that have been proposed by 
economists to quantify uncertainty. The third section assesses the im-
portance of fluctuations in uncertainty on household purchases, first 
using a simple bivariate model and then using a model that incorpo-
rates more relevant information.
I.   A FRAMEWORK FOR UNCERTAINTY SHOCKS AND 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Uncertainty is an important feature of the real world and plays a 
central role in modern macroeconomics. Yet uncertainty can be inter-
preted in a number of ways. To fix ideas, this section provides a frame-
work for thinking about uncertainty and how it might change over 
time. With this framework in place, the section then considers how 
economic agents respond to fluctuations in uncertainty in theoretical 
models. The common theme of these theories is that an increase in 
uncertainty tends to dampen spending immediately, as businesses and 
consumers enter a “wait-and-see” mode. This response is especially 
characteristic of expensive purchases that are difficult to undo. Over 
time, as the increase in uncertainty wears off, economic activity tends 
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What is an uncertainty shock?
Economic models incorporate uncertainty about the future through 
random disturbances, or shocks. For example, a household may know 
its wealth today, but its wealth tomorrow may be uncertain because it 
is subject to shocks that are ultimately beyond the household’s control. 
To analyze the effects of such shocks, economists usually assume 
that the probability distribution of the shocks—that is, the likelihood 
of a shock of a given size occurring—is both known and constant over 
time. The blue bars in Chart 1 provide an example of a distribution 
of shocks that can affect future wealth. The possible outcomes range 
from negative shocks that reduce wealth by a certain amount to posi-
tive shocks that increase wealth. By assumption, the household knows 
both the range of possible shocks and their associated probabilities (the 
heights of the bars). These probabilities are typically assumed not to 
change over time. Not knowing exactly which of the five shocks will oc-
cur in the future is thus the only source of uncertainty in this example. 
Recent research has considered the possibility that there may be an 
additional source of uncertainty. In particular, the shape of the prob-
ability distribution of shocks may change over time.1  As an example, in 
Chart 1 the probabilities of the different shocks may change from the 
blue bars to the black bars and vice versa. This change in the probability 
distribution represents an uncertainty shock. 
An uncertainty shock does not affect the level of wealth directly, as a 
wealth shock does. Rather, an uncertainty shock affects the distribution 
of shocks that can affect wealth by changing the variance of the distri-
bution while leaving the mean constant.2 An increase in uncertainty 
(a positive uncertainty shock) makes outcomes more uncertain in the 
sense that tail events, or realizations at the extremes of the distribution, 
have a higher probability of occurring. This is equivalent to moving 
from the blue distribution to the black distribution in the chart.3
From a household’s perspective, uncertainty shocks can take a num-
ber of different forms. For example, an uncertainty shock may be as-
sociated with a more volatile stock market. Such volatility simultane-
ously raises the probabilities of much higher and much lower wealth in 
the future. But uncertainty shocks can also affect a household’s income 
prospects. Greater uncertainty could simultaneously raise the likelihood 66  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
that an individual may lose a job, resulting in lower near-term income 
prospects, or find a better job, resulting in higher income prospects.
What does economic theory predict?
While theoretical models generally incorporate random shocks, 
they do not typically allow the probability distribution of shocks to 
change over time. Thus, they do not account for uncertainty shocks as 
defined above. To understand the effects of uncertainty shocks, econo-
mists have primarily relied on the real options framework.4
The real options framework draws on insights from financial mar-
kets. In the market for financial assets, the buyer of a call option ac-
quires the right—but not the obligation—to purchase a specified fi-
nancial asset at a given price by a particular time in the future. This 
call option gives the buyer additional time to acquire more information 
and determine whether to buy the financial asset. Economists use the 
phrase “real options” to denote investments in economic (or “real”) as-
sets, as opposed to investments in financial assets. At its essence, the real 
options framework captures the notion that under some circumstances 
there may be a benefit to waiting and acquiring more information be-
fore making a decision to invest in a real asset.
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A key feature underlying the real options framework is irrevers-
ibility. For instance, a firm may purchase a new, customized piece of 
equipment that cannot be sold to another firm without incurring a loss. 
Alternatively, a firm may face costs associated with hiring new workers 
(such as posting a vacancy, screening applicants, and training new hires) 
and firing workers (such as severance packages). In either case—the 
purchase of a new piece of capital or the hiring of a new worker—the 
decision cannot be reversed costlessly. 
By themselves, irreversibilities can cause firms to delay acting when 
faced with an uncertain future. In particular, firms typically want to 
make sure that times are “good enough” or “bad enough” to justify mak-
ing an irreversible decision that they may later wish they could undo. As 
a result, they may not respond to very small shocks, or they may wait for 
enough positive or negative shocks to accumulate before acting.5
Irreversibilities combined with uncertainty shocks make firms even 
more cautious. An uncertainty shock raises the likelihood of extreme 
outcomes; for instance, after an uncertainty shock firms may see the po-
tential for much higher or lower future profits than previously expect-
ed. Faced with this increased level of uncertainty, firms’ first choice is 
to wait for more information, if possible, before acting. In other words, 
the value of the real option of waiting is greater after an uncertainty 
shock than in normal times. Firms that do act would want to ensure 
that times are “really good enough” or “really bad enough” before doing 
so to limit the number of occasions when the firm makes an irreversible 
decision it may later regret if it were to face an extreme outcome.6  
This phenomenon has also been termed the “bad news principle” 
because the increased threat of negative outcomes swamps the simulta-
neous increased possibility of positive outcomes, thereby reducing ac-
tivity (Bernanke). If enough firms follow the bad news principle, then 
this uncertainty shock can produce an economic downturn.7
But the effects of uncertainty shocks are not limited to firms. Un-
certainty shocks are usually felt throughout the economy, affecting 
households as well. In addition, like firms, households must sometimes 
make irreversible decisions. For example, purchases of houses cannot 
be reversed quickly and costlessly due to real estate agent commissions, 
closing costs associated with obtaining a mortgage, and moving costs. 
Purchases of durable goods, notably cars, are also difficult to reverse. 68  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The prices of barely used cars are considerably less than the prices of 
brand new cars—the well-known lemons problem (Akerlof).8 Such ir-
reversibilities, however, may be less pronounced or even absent when 
consumers purchase other nondurable goods and services.9
Even under normal circumstances, irreversibilities make house-
holds cautious about purchasing houses or durable goods because they 
would rather not make a purchase they must quickly undo. The arrival 
of an uncertainty shock may cause households to become even more 
cautious. While households know their current income and wealth, the 
uncertainty shock may lead them to believe that the distribution of fu-
ture income and wealth prospects favors more extreme outcomes, as il-
lustrated in Chart 1. As a result, the uncertainty shock amplifies house-
holds’ caution, making them less likely to act. That is, the real option 
value of waiting temporarily increases. As a consequence, households 
optimally respond by reducing their purchases of houses and durable 
goods below normal levels. The decline in purchases of durable goods 
may even coincide with a rise in spending on nondurable goods, as 
households shift how they spend their current wealth (Romer).
Over time, the uncertainty shock subsides and households gain 
more information about their income and wealth prospects. As un-
certainty returns to a more normal level, households realize they own 
fewer houses and durable goods than they consider optimal given their 
reduced uncertainty. Their pent-up demand thus causes a temporary 
surge in spending.
Chart 2 illustrates this bust-boom pattern for the durable goods 
that face irreversibilities. When the uncertainty shock occurs in period 
0, households immediately postpone purchases and activity falls below 
trend. Within a short time, activity rebounds as the uncertainty is re-
solved and households act on their pent-up demand.
II.   MEASURING UNCERTAINTY
Considering variations in the level of uncertainty in a macroeco-
nomic model may seem straightforward. But capturing the intangible 
movements of uncertainty in the real world can be problematic. To this 
end, economists have considered many different proxies for the level of 
uncertainty, which in turn can be used to identify uncertainty shocks. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  69
To examine the impact of uncertainty shocks on household purchases, 
this article focuses on two measures of uncertainty.
The first measure is based on the monthly appearance of the words 
“uncertainty” or “uncertain” in articles in The New York Times (Alexo-
polous and Cohen). Highly uncertain times are likely to be reported as 
such by journalists. When uncertainty is not as important, it is unlike-
ly to be newsworthy. Thus, the written record can provide one measure 
of intangible uncertainty. To ensure that the use of the word relates to 
the economy rather than to, say, fall fashion lines, the article must also 
contain the words “economy” or “economic.”
The New York Times has a number of attributes that make it attrac-
tive for such a project. It is one of the nation’s most widely read news-
papers and a primary New York City metropolitan newspaper. Hence, 
its published articles capture both the nation’s and Wall Street’s senti-
ments on the economy. The Times website also has an online archive 
that allows for relatively easy searches of previously published articles 
dating back to its founding in 1851. This provides ample coverage of 
the time period considered in this article, which begins in the 1960s. 
Chart 2
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECTS OF AN  
UNCERTAINTY SHOCK
Note: The uncertainty shock occurs at time 0 on the horizontal axis.
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Over time, variation in the number of articles mentioning uncer-
tainty could reflect either changes in the frequency of such articles in 
the Times or changes in the total number of articles published within 
a given month. To correct for this possibility, this article computes the 
frequency of uncertainty references by calculating the ratio of monthly 
articles on economic uncertainty to the total number of articles.10
The second measure of uncertainty is derived from monthly stock 
market volatility.11 More uncertain times may be associated with highly 
volatile stock price movements, reflecting rapid shifts in investor senti-
ment between positive and negative outlooks. To protect themselves 
from this volatility, investors may also increase their use of options to 
hedge their positions. Several previous studies have focused on stock 
market volatility as a measure of uncertainty, including Bloom (2009).12 
The volatility-uncertainty measure in this analysis updates the series 
from Bloom’s paper, which begins in 1962, through the end of the 
sample period in 2010.
In general, the two measures of uncertainty tend to move with each 
other (Chart 3). Their correlation is 0.51. Both uncertainty measures 
exhibit their highest readings during the 2007-09 recession, and their 
lowest readings came during the 1960s and the mid-2000s. During 
the peak of the crisis in 2008, almost 2 percent of all articles in the 
Times contained references to economic uncertainty, compared with 
only about 0.25 percent of all articles at the beginning of 2007. The 
volatility index also surged about seven-fold during this period.
Episodes of economic and financial disruption are marked by an 
increase in the level and volatility of the uncertainty measures. The 
1970s, for instance, witnessed large oil price spikes, the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, multiple recessions, 
and stagflation. The Times uncertainty measure remained elevated and 
volatile during that period. Stock market volatility exhibited a number 
of spikes but returned to more normal levels for parts of the decade. 
Events like the Gulf Wars and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, have also coincided with abrupt spikes in uncertainty. 
Closely tying the uncertainty measures to the state of the business 
cycle is more challenging. Recessions (the gray bars in Chart 3) tend to 
coincide with spikes in uncertainty using both measures. However, not 
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Black Monday on October 19, 1987, when the S&P 500 index fell 20 
percent. At the other extreme, long economic expansions with strong 
growth tend to coincide with low or declining uncertainty, as in the 
1960s or 1990s. But even these expansions coincided with some spikes 
in uncertainty, such as around the collapse of the Long Term Capital 
Management hedge fund in 1998. 
The two measures exhibit some notable differences. In particular, 
the Times identified the 1970s as a period of generally higher uncer-
tainty than the stock market volatility measure. In addition, during the 
boom of the 1990s the volatility-uncertainty measure started low and 
then moved higher, while the Times measure started high and moved 
steadily lower. More generally, the Times uncertainty ratio exhibited 
more spikes during nonrecession periods than the volatility index, per-
haps because the Times is a broader measure of uncertainty.
III.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Recessions tend to coincide with spikes in uncertainty. This raises 
the possibility that uncertainty shocks might be an important factor in 
generating recessions as households pull back on their spending. But 
Chart 3
TWO UNCERTAINTY MEASURES: THE TIMES RATIO 
AND STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY
Notes: The Times uncertainty ratio and stock market volatility are defined in the text. The gray recession bars use the 




















































































































































market volatility  
(right) 72  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
not all uncertainty spikes coincide with recessions. Moreover, it is pos-
sible that recessions cause uncertainty spikes instead of the reverse. Dis-
entangling these factors in a rigorous way therefore requires empirical 
analysis to determine uncertainty’s role in the business cycle.
This section provides evidence from vector autoregressions (VARs) 
on how households respond to uncertainty shocks. In simple bivariate 
VAR models, households appear to behave largely as the theoretical 
models would suggest: An uncertainty shock produces an immediate 
drop in spending followed by a rebound. 
But when the VAR is augmented to include more variables, these 
results tend to disappear. In these cases, uncertainty shocks typically 
are associated with modest reductions in household purchases that can 
take a considerable time to appear. Moreover, uncertainty shocks ac-
count for only a small portion of fluctuations in household spending. 
These results suggest that uncertainty shocks—at least as they are com-
monly captured—do not appear to be a key factor driving household 
spending decisions.
Bivariate models of uncertainty and household spending
As a first pass, it is useful to consider how the uncertainty measures 
affect household spending in the simplest model: a bivariate VAR. In 
this model, one uncertainty measure—either the Times uncertainty ra-
tio or the stock market volatility index—is paired with one measure 
of household spending. For household spending, this article considers 
four separate measures: new home sales, real durable goods consump-
tion, real nondurable goods consumption, and real services consump-
tion.13 Economic theory predicts that uncertainty shocks should have 
the largest impact on irreversible spending decisions, such as hous-
ing and durables. In contrast, spending on nondurables and services 
should be little affected, or may actually increase if consumers shift 
purchases to these items in the face of an uncertainty shock. All data 
are monthly to capture high-frequency responses to uncertainty shocks 
and run from July 1962 to October 2010.14  
Following a Times uncertainty shock, new home sales follow a 
bust-boom pattern similar to the pattern suggested by the real options 
framework (Chart 4, panel A).15 In the month that the shock occurs, 
sales decline immediately and by a considerable amount. As the un-ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  73
certainty shock subsides, new home sales quickly rebound. Within 12 
months of the shock, sales move above their trend level for a time and, 
within three to four years, return to their normal trend level.
The Times uncertainty shock also produces bust-boom dynamics 
for the three components of consumer spending, though the patterns 
differ slightly from the response of new home sales. Durable consump-
tion (panel B) and nondurable consumption (panel C) both decline 
immediately, but consumption of services (panel D) does not. In all 
three cases, the largest declines are about one year after the shock oc-
curs rather than on impact. Consumer spending moves above its nor-
mal trend levels for a time about two years after the shock. This is con-
siderably longer than the bust-boom pattern documented by Bloom 
(2009) for the manufacturing sector, where activity drops sharply be-
low trend following an uncertainty shock but remains there for only 
six to 12 months. (The Appendix replicates Bloom’s empirical findings 
Chart 4
HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO A TIMES UNCERTAINTY 
SHOCK, BIVARIATE MODEL
Notes: Uncertainty shocks are derived from The New York Times ratio measure.  The uncertainty shock occurs in 
period 0.  The gray shaded area is the one-standard-error band.  Given the different sizes of the responses, the vertical 
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for industrial production and employment in the manufacturing sector 
in response to large uncertainty shocks.)  There is no evidence that an 
uncertainty shock produces an increase in spending on nondurables and 
services as consumers substitute away from irreversible purchases, which 
contrasts with the results of Romer.
The relative sizes of the responses conform to the predictions of 
the real options framework. The spending declines are largest for the 
most expensive, partly irreversible items—houses and durable goods. 
Household spending on nondurable goods and services is less affected. 
The household responses are similar following an uncertainty shock 
based on stock market volatility (Chart 5). The ordering of the size of 
the responses is the same, although the magnitudes differ modestly. Ad-
ditionally, new home sales go through a longer period of retrenchment 
in this case, remaining below trend for one to two years, and do not 
exhibit the bust-boom cycle seen earlier.
The results from the bivariate regressions generally suggest that 
uncertainty shocks substantively dampen household spending. The de-
clines in spending occur quickly, often immediately. The largest reduc-
tions are on irreversible purchases of new homes and durables. These 
results are in line with the theoretical predictions of the real options 
framework developed earlier.16
Multivariate models with uncertainty shocks
While bivariate models can be useful, they have important short-
comings. Most notably, bivariate models may omit other relevant ex-
planatory variables. For instance, wealth and income prospects may af-
fect household spending. If a shock to one of these factors affects the 
uncertainty measures before it affects household spending, then the 
bivariate regression would mistakenly attribute the subsequent move-
ments in spending to uncertainty shocks rather than the true source.
Capturing more completely the relevant determinants of household 
spending thus requires incorporating more variables into the VAR. The 
more complete empirical model contains the following variables: the 
level of the S&P 500 stock market index, the measure of uncertainty, 
the federal funds rate, wages, the consumer price index, hours worked, 
the number of employees on nonfarm payrolls, new single-family home 
sales, real durable goods consumption, real nondurable goods con-ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  75
Chart 5
HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO A VOLATILITY- 
UNCERTAINTY SHOCK, BIVARIATE MODEL
Notes: Uncertainty shocks are derived from stock market volatility. The uncertainty shock occurs in period 0. The 
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sumption, and real services consumption.17 Data limitations shorten 
the timeframe to January 1965 through October 2010.
Uncertainty and The New York Times. In the wake of a shock that 
increases the Times uncertainty measure, households behave quite dif-
ferently than suggested by the bivariate results (Chart 6).18 In the bi-
variate model, new home sales experienced a sharp, immediate decline 
that persisted about a year. But the multivariate results (panel A) show 
a different pattern. The point estimate (the blue line) implies an imme-
diate drop, then a rebound and subsequent decline that persists almost 
three years. But the vast majority of this response is not statistically 
significant. The gray one-standard-error band includes zero for all but 
months zero, eight, and ten. 
The picture is similarly murky for durable goods consumption 
(panel B), nondurable goods consumption (panel C), and services con-
sumption (panel D). All the point estimates for these measures turn 76  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
negative at some point, but not immediately. Notably, spending on 
consumer durables is initially above trend for a time before turning 
negative toward the end of the first year after the shock. 
Overall, these results suggest that uncertainty shocks as measured by 
The New York Times index only modestly curtail household purchases, 
after controlling for other factors. There is no evidence of substantial 
immediate declines in spending, especially on irreversible purchases of 
items such as new homes and durable goods. These results contradict 
the intuition from the real options framework and the results from the 
manufacturing sector presented by Bloom (2009), where an uncertainty 
shock can have powerful, immediate effects.19
Uncertainty  and  stock  market  volatility. When uncertainty is mea-
sured with the stock market volatility measure, the multivariate analysis 
yields somewhat surprising results (Chart 7).20 Immediately following an   
Chart 6
HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO A TIMES UNCERTAINTY 
SHOCK, MULTIVARIATE MODEL
Notes: Uncertainty shocks are derived from The New York Times ratio measure. The uncertainty shock occurs in 
period 0. The gray shaded area is the one-standard-error band. Given the different sizes of the responses, the vertical 
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uncertainty shock, little happens to new home sales (panel A) and ser-
vices consumption (panel D). While their behavior is volatile, house-
hold spending on durable goods (panel B) and nondurable goods (pan-
el C) actually both rise modestly above trend for a time.21 Eventually, 
households respond by reducing all categories of spending relative to 
their normal levels, but only after a delay of one to three years following 
the shock. 
The household responses for new home sales and durable goods con-
sumption are at odds with the predictions of the real options framework. 
According to that framework, spending that is highly irreversible should 
decline immediately as households wait for uncertainty to be resolved.22  
Overall, these results suggest that uncertainty shocks captured 
through stock market volatility can weigh on household purchases. 
However, the dynamics are not immediate and take a considerable time 
to appear.23
Chart 7
HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO A VOLATILITY–  
UNCERTAINTY SHOCK, MULTIVARIATE MODEL
Notes: Uncertainty shocks are derived from stock market volatility. The uncertainty shock occurs in period 0. The 
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Variance decompositions. Evidence from the VARs on the response 
of household spending to uncertainty shocks suggests shocks can 
moderately reduce household purchases. Further evidence on the 
quantitative importance of uncertainty shocks comes from estimating 
the extent to which they explain movements in household spending 
relative to other factors. In particular, this exercise—a forecast error 
variance decomposition—estimates the percentage of movements in 
the four measures of household purchases that can be explained by 
the variables in the VAR (Table 1).
The exact quantitative estimates depend on the measure of uncer-
tainty used in the VAR and the time horizon. The first column shows 
the contributions of uncertainty shocks using the two measures over 
two different time horizons. For instance, over a 12-month horizon, 
shocks to the Times uncertainty measure explain about 1 percent of the 
forecast variance in new home sales. By contrast, shocks to the level of 
the S&P 500 explain about 7 percent of the variance in new home sales. 
Over a 48-month horizon, the volatility uncertainty measure explains 
about 5 percent of the variance in new home sales, and the stock market 
explains about 14 percent.
The variance decomposition shows that uncertainty shocks explain 
only a small fraction of the movements in household purchases, whether 
for new home sales, durable goods, nondurable goods, or services. This is 
true at both short horizons and long horizons. Using stock market volatil-
ity as a proxy for household uncertainty explains a larger fraction of the 
variances, but the percentages remain below 10 percent at all horizons con-
sidered. In general, the variance decompositions suggest that uncertainty 
shocks are a small source of fluctuations in household purchases.
By contrast, shocks to the level of the S&P 500, the federal funds 
rate, and the consumer price index explain a much larger share of fluc-
tuations.24 Of these variables, shocks that depress the level of the S&P 
500 generate household responses most similar to the predictions of 
the real options model: Spending on irreversible purchases falls imme-
diately and by a sizable amount, only to rebound shortly thereafter to 
above-normal levels for a time. However, it is not clear that these re-
sponses are necessarily due to uncertainty because stock market declines 
operate through a number of channels. For example, a decline in the ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  79
Table 1
FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION














Time horizon: 12 months
New home sales 1 7 15 2 8 7 6
Consumption of durable goods 1 10 10 0 16 3 4
Consumption of nondurable goods 1 17 4 1 16 1 5
Consumption of services 2 10 13 1 4 3 1
Time horizon: 48 months
New home sales 1 15 15 4 9 5 7
Consumption of durable goods 1 10 19 1 17 2 6
Consumption of nondurable goods 2 15 8 2 17 1 5














Time horizon: 12 months
New home sales 0 8 15 1 6 5 6
Consumption of durable goods 3 12 9 1 13 2 4
Consumption of nondurable goods 3 19 4 1 12 1 5
Consumption of services 0 13 12 1 4 2 0
Time horizon: 48 months
New home sales 5 14 13 4 11 3 8
Consumption of durable goods 5 12 17 3 17 2 7
Consumption of nondurable goods 4 18 6 5 14 1 7
Consumption of services 3 19 15 5 9 2 3
Notes: NYT stands for The New York Times. The remaining terms in the VAR are omitted.
stock market can exert negative wealth effects on households or reflect 
expectations of future household spending.
Alternative explanations. Why do consumers not exhibit “wait-and-
see” behavior following an uncertainty shock, as the real options theory 
would predict? One possible explanation is that the model generating 
real options behavior is misspecified. That is, it does not capture the 
relevant factors that actually determine household spending, so house-
holds are not affected by real options to the extent predicted by the 
theory. A second possibility is that consumers might ignore small un-
certainty shocks but respond to large uncertainty shocks. Because the 
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to the size of the uncertainty shock. This precludes the possibility of 
radically different responses to small and large uncertainty shocks. But, 
as shown in the Appendix, focusing only on large uncertainty shocks 
generates effects on household spending similar to the other measures 
used in the text. A third possible explanation is that economists have 
not found the right proxy for uncertainty. Measuring uncertainty is in-
herently difficult, given its intangible nature.25  Uncertainty may there-
fore be captured within the VAR by some other variable.26 
IV.   CONCLUSION
Uncertainty surged during the financial crisis in 2008 and remained 
high through a considerable portion of the recovery into 2010. Since 
then, uncertainty has risen again due to the recent oil price spikes and 
the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami in Japan. This heightened 
uncertainty raises the question: How does it affect economic activity?
This article focuses on how households respond to uncertainty 
shocks—sudden, unexpected events that raise the possibility of extreme 
future outcomes, either good or bad. Economic theory predicts that 
household purchases would decline immediately following an uncertain-
ty shock because households would find a value in waiting to make big, 
irreversible purchases to see how the uncertain environment plays out.
The empirical results, however, suggest that uncertainty shocks 
tend to curtail household spending only modestly. In some cases, 
these responses manifest themselves only after a considerable period. 
In addition, uncertainty shocks account for only a small portion of 
the total fluctuations in household spending. These results suggest 
that commonly used measures of uncertainty shocks do not appear to 
be a key factor driving households’ spending decisions and, in turn, 
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APPENDIX
THE EFFECTS OF LARGE UNCERTAINTY SHOCKS
The uncertainty measures considered in this article allow for a 
continuum of shock sizes. In addition, the empirical VAR models are 
all linear: Doubling the size of a given shock doubles the size of the 
response. It is possible that these assumptions are incorrect when con-
sidering uncertainty. In particular, households may ignore small un-
certainty shocks, but they may react to large uncertainty shocks in a 
manner consistent with the real options framework. It may therefore 
be necessary to separate the small and large shocks when conducting 
the analysis.27
This Appendix considers a measure of large uncertainty shocks 
suggested by Bloom (2009): A large uncertainty shock occurs in a giv-
en month if stock market volatility, as explained in Section II, experi-
ences a large jump in that month.28 The Appendix first replicates some 
of Bloom’s findings for the manufacturing sector. It then analyzes how 
households respond to large uncertainty shocks. 
The results from large uncertainty shocks on household purchases 
are generally similar to those from the other measures of uncertainty 
shocks. While simple bivariate models tend to find that large uncer-
tainty shocks immediately depress spending, the multivariate results 
are more complicated. In fact, some spending measures actually in-
crease before they experience a substantial decline in the wake of a large 
uncertainty shock. Large uncertainty shocks based on jumps in stock 
market volatility therefore do not appear to be a key factor behind 
weakness in household spending.
Large uncertainty shocks and manufacturing firms
Much of the recent emphasis on uncertainty shocks has been 
stimulated by evidence from the manufacturing sector (Bloom 2009). 
A VAR similar to the multivariate VARs in the body of the article 
can capture how manufacturing firms respond to large uncertainty 
shocks.29
In the aftermath of a large uncertainty shock, manufacturing pro-
duction and employment follow patterns broadly consistent with the 
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sharp decline that lasts about six months (Chart A1, panel A).30 After 
that point, the bust gives way to a boom, with production surging above 
its normal level for one to two years. About three years after the large 
uncertainty shock occurs, this bust-boom cycle has effectively played 
itself out and production returns to its normal trend level.
Employment in the manufacturing sector follows these bust-boom 
movements in production with a slight delay (panel B).31  Immedi-
ately following a large uncertainty shock, manufacturers reduce payrolls 
below their normal levels; given that production is declining, they do 
not need the same amount of labor. As production overshoots its nor-
mal level, employment rebounds, rising above its normal level as well. 
About three years after the large uncertainty shock occurs, employment 
and production both return to normal.
Large uncertainty shocks and household purchases
With this same measure of large uncertainty shocks, it is also possi-
ble to use VARs to analyze household behavior. To match the endpoint 
of Bloom’s measure of large uncertainty shocks, the sample ends in June 
2008. The VAR specifications are the same as those used in Section 
III, but with the measure of large uncertainty shocks replacing the old 
measure of uncertainty.32
The bivariate regression results bear a number of similarities to those 
seen earlier (Chart A2). Quantitatively, the responses are larger, which is 
not surprising given the fact that the exercise now considers only large 
uncertainty shocks. But qualitatively, the patterns are generally similar 
to those from Charts 4 and 5. All measures of household spending de-
cline immediately following a large uncertainty shock, with the greatest 
declines coming from new home sales and durable goods consumption. 
Similar to the Times uncertainty shock response, the decline in new 
home sales (panel A) is short-lived and gives way to a surge in sales 
above trend. This behavior seems to conform closely to the real options 
framework and the results from the manufacturing sector. However, the 
other series take a considerable time to return to trend—far longer than 
the declines in manufacturing.
While all four measures of household spending decline in the wake 
of the large uncertainty shock in bivariate regressions—as suggested by 
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into a multivariate model produces much different, counterintuitive re-
sponses (Chart A3). After declining slightly on impact, new home sales 
(panel A) rise abruptly above trend for a year before dropping below 
trend for the subsequent two years. This response is essentially the exact 
opposite of what the real options framework would predict. Durable 
goods consumption (panel B) falls on impact but then immediately re-
bounds, spending some time above trend, before eventually falling back 
below normal levels long after the large uncertainty shock occurred.
The responses of new home sales and durable goods consumption 
suggest that large uncertainty shocks based on jumps in stock market 
volatility are not a key factor behind weakness in household spending.
Chart A1
MANUFACTURING RESPONSES TO A LARGE  
UNCERTAINTY SHOCK
Notes: The definition of a large uncertainty shock follows from Bloom (2009). The uncertainty shock occurs 
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Chart A2
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Chart A3
HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO A LARGE UNCERTAINTY 
SHOCK, MULTIVARIATE MODEL
Notes: The definition of a large uncertainty shock follows from Bloom (2009). The uncertainty shock occurs (takes 
on the value of 1) in period 0. The gray shaded area is the one-standard-error band. Given the different sizes of the 
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ENDNOTES
1That is, there are second-moment shocks that occur alongside the more tra-
ditional first-moment shocks that are a standard feature of modern dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
2Note that given the possible outcomes and the associated probabilities, the 
means of the two distributions in the chart are identical, but the variance of the 
distribution in the black bars is higher. Most DSGE models allow for normally 
distributed stochastic shocks. Consequently, an increase in the variance of the 
distribution does not imply a wider set of possible outcomes; with a normal dis-
tribution, these are infinite. However, an increase in uncertainty under a discrete 
approximation, such as in the chart, could witness a wider range of potential 
outcomes as well as higher probabilities for the tail events.
3While uncertainty shocks allow for changes to the probability distribu-
tion, all the possible outcomes are still known. This contrasts with the notion of 
“Knightian uncertainty,” in which uncertainty and possible outcomes are ulti-
mately unmeasurable and unquantifiable (Knight 1921). While this type of un-
certainty is relevant for the real world, capturing it in even the most state-of-the-
art macro models has proven challenging.
4Bernanke (1983) is one of the early works that introduced real options the-
ory into firms’ investment decisions over the business cycle. Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) provide a thorough treatment of real options. Bloom (2009) has restimu-
lated interest in uncertainty shocks and real options for firms’ investment deci-
sions. Davig and Hakkio (2010) consider the real options framework for their 
analysis of the effects of financial stress on economic activity, but ultimately they 
focus on a model with a financial accelerator.
5Economists usually use (S,s) models to explain firms’ decisions in the pres-
ence of fixed costs and irreversibilities. These (S,s) models generate thresholds, or 
(S,s) bands, such that the firm will only take action if it finds itself pushed beyond 
those thresholds. Between the thresholds is a range of inaction, in which the firm 
will choose to wait before acting. When a firm does act, it reoptimizes and places 
itself back in the range of inaction. In this sense, the firm may decide not to re-
spond to small shocks if it is still in the interior of the range of inaction, instead 
allowing shocks to accumulate before the firm is pushed to its (S,s) band and acts.
6In an (S,s) framework, the uncertainty shock expands the (S,s) bands, which 
can lead firms to delay taking actions. 
7Bloom (2007, 2009); Bloom, et al. (2010); and Alexopoulos and Cohen 
(2009) provide results supporting a key role for uncertainty shocks in business 
cycle fluctuations. The results presented in Bachmann and Bayer (2011) and 
Bachmann, et al. (2010) question these findings.
8Romer (1990); Eberly (1994); Carroll and Dunn (1997); Foote, et al. 
(2000); Hassler (2001); and Bertola, et al. (2005) provide additional detail on ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  87
households’ purchases of housing and durables under various aspects of uncer-
tainty. While some of these studies focus on consumer spending at the level of the 
individual household, this article focuses on aggregate household spending.
9Some categories of nondurable goods, such as clothing, might be better 
referred to as “semidurable”; others, such as fresh fruit, are clearly “perishable.”   
Romer’s (1990) study using data from around the beginning of the Great Depres-
sion in 1929 and 1930 grouped goods into the categories of durable goods, semi-
durable goods, and perishable goods. The more recent convention, however, is to 
divide consumer spending into durable goods, nondurable goods, and services.
10This ratio was constructed in multiple steps. The first step required search-
ing through The New York Times’ website (http://www.nytimes.com) for articles that 
contained the words “uncertain” or “uncertainty,” along with the words “econo-
my” or “economic.”  Because the Times’ web search function is relatively rudimen-
tary, this required conducting nine different searches for each month. These nine 
searches were:
uncertain economy -uncertainty -economic
uncertain economic -uncertainty -economy
uncertainty economy -uncertain -economic
uncertainty economic -uncertain -economy
uncertain economy uncertainty -economic
uncertain economy economic -uncertainty
uncertain economic uncertainty -economy
uncertainty economy economic -uncertain
uncertain economic uncertainty economy
A hyphen in front of an identifier indicated exclusion from the search cri-
terion. Hence, the combination “uncertain economy -uncertainty -economic” 
searched all the articles that contained the words “uncertain” and “economy,” and 
that did not contain the words “uncertainty” and “economic.” 
The second step required determining the total number of news articles pub-
lished during a month. To approximate this number, the word “the” was searched, 
since this was assumed to be the most common and essential word in an article. 
The Times uncertainty measure is thus the ratio of the sum of the nine “uncer-
tainty” searches to the number of articles containing “the.”
During the sample period, several months provided erroneous search results. 
The search results for August 1978 produced only 23 percent of the average num-
ber of monthly articles published in previous months, and The New York Times 
search engine provided no results for September and October 1978. To smooth 
through these missing data points, linear interpolation was used between July and 
November 1978.
Search results for May and July 2010 produced repetitions for the “uncer-
tainty” searches. (That is, some articles appeared in the search results more than 
once.)  The sum of the nine “uncertainty” searches was corrected by subtracting 
the number of repeated articles from the total, where the number of repeated 88  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
articles was computed by hand. Although it was feasible to make this correction 
for the “uncertainty” articles, the same correction for the total number of articles 
containing “the” was infeasible. (The number of returned “the” articles was greater 
than 12,000 in these months; surrounding months had fewer than 9,000 articles.)   
To correct the denominator of the frequency measure, the ratio of non-repeated 
“uncertainty” searches to total “uncertainty” searches was multiplied by the num-
ber of “the” searches.
11Following Bloom (2009), the stock market volatility-uncertainty measure 
is built using the VXO index (http://www.cboe.com/micro/vxo/ ) of percentage im-
plied volatility of the S&P 100 30-day option. This index dates back to 1986. 
Prior to that, the actual volatility of the S&P 500 index is used as a proxy for 
uncertainty. VXO data are available on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange 
website (http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx) at a daily frequency and 
were converted to a monthly frequency by averaging. More details can be found at 
Nicholas Bloom’s website, http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/.
12Among others, see also Romer (1990) and Hassler (2001). Bloom (2009) 
identified uncertainty shocks as discrete events. An uncertainty shock occurred 
within a given month (i.e., took on a value of one) if the detrended stock market 
volatility level rose more than 1.65 standard deviations above the mean; other-
wise, an uncertainty shock did not occur (i.e., took on a value of zero). This re-
sulted in a set of 17 uncertainty shocks between 1962 and 2008. See the Appendix 
of Bloom (2009) for more details. The Appendix to this article takes a closer look 
at Bloom’s identified uncertainty shocks and the responses of household spending.
13The measure of new single-family home sales is based on signed contracts: To 
the extent that households would immediately pull back in the wake of an uncer-
tainty shock, this measure would capture such behavior better than existing home 
sales, which are based on closings. While housing starts and permits could be an-
other way to capture housing activity, some of this activity would reflect speculation 
on the part of builders rather than purchase activity on the part of households. The 
measures of monthly real consumer spending on durables, nondurables, and services 
come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1995 onward. Prior to 1995, the 
monthly real measures were constructed by deflating nominal consumer spending 
by the respective price deflator for that type of spending. 
14All variables enter the baseline VARs in detrended form after using the Ho-
drick-Prescott filter with weight 129,600, following Bloom (2009). The measures of 
household spending are detrended in natural log form. All VARs use 12 lags given 
the monthly data frequency and include a constant term. The uncertainty shock is 
one standard deviation. All standard error bands are constructed via 1,000 bootstraps.
15The bivariate VARs use a Cholesky decomposition to identify the orthogo-
nalized uncertainty shocks, with the uncertainty measure ordered first and the 
household spending measure second. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  89
16In many cases, these results are sensitive to the decision to detrend the data 
before running the VARs. One alternative is to run the bivariate VARs using one 
uncertainty measure and the natural log of one measure of household spending, 
neither of which is detrended. In this case, all eight combinations show declines in 
household spending. New home sales decline immediately and eventually return 
within one to two years to their starting values using either measure for the uncer-
tainty shock. For the other six combinations, the point estimates for the spend-
ing responses do not return to their original starting points within four years. A 
second alternative is to consider a Blanchard-Quah decomposition, in the spirit 
of Bachmann, et al. (2010), where uncertainty shocks are identified using the 
long-run restriction that they cannot have permanent effects on real variables. In 
this case, new home sales using either uncertainty measure experience statistically 
significant declines following an uncertainty shock. But the results for the other six 
combinations are markedly different. Using The New York Times measure, point 
estimates for real spending on durables, nondurables, and services all rise follow-
ing the shock, though the increases are rarely statistically significant. Using the 
stock market volatility measure, the responses are highly volatile but largely cen-
tered around zero.
17The choice of variables and the baseline ordering is based on Bloom (2009); 
alternative orderings are considered below. Ordering potentially matters because 
orthogonalized shocks are identified using a Cholesky decomposition. The mea-
sure of wages is total private average hourly earnings of production workers. The 
measure of hours is total private average weekly hours of production workers. All 
variables enter the VAR in detrended form after using the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
with weight 129,600. The measures of household spending, the S&P 500 index 
level, wages, the consumer price index, hours, and nonfarm payrolls are detrended 
in natural log form.
18The shock is one standard deviation, so the uncertainty ratio index imme-
diately jumps one standard deviation above its normal, trend level in month zero. 
The jump in uncertainty is short-lived: it spikes in month 0, and within three 
to four months it has returned to its normal level, based on either The New York 
Times measure or the stock market volatility measure.
19These results also contrast with those of Alexopolous and Cohen (2009), 
who find a bust-boom pattern in consumer spending (though they do not consid-
er housing) similar to Bloom (2009). There are several potential explanations for 
this. First, Alexopolous and Cohen use the total number of uncertainty articles in 
The New York Times in their regressions (i.e., the level), rather than the ratio of un-
certainty articles to total articles. In our baseline VAR with the detrended level of 
uncertainty substituted for the ratio, the four measures of household spending all 
experience statistically significant declines following an uncertainty shock. How-
ever, it takes some time for these declines to appear—from about four months to 
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cant boom thereafter. Second, Alexopolous and Cohen consider smaller VARs, 
which will tend to push the results closer to the bivariate models.
20Romer (1990) and Hassler (2001) both focus on stock market volatility as 
a proxy for uncertainty when studying household behavior.
21This is reminiscent of the “price puzzle,” in which VAR studies often find 
that the price level initially rises following a positive shock to (i.e., a tightening 
of) the federal funds rate.
22The positive response of nondurables consumption and the immediate 
(though small) jump in services consumption are consistent with the predictions 
of Romer (1990).
23It is also possible to consider different orderings of the variables in the VAR, 
for both The New York Times and stock market volatility measures of uncertainty, 
though with 11 variables it is not possible to try all combinations. 
For instance, Christiano, et al. (2005) suggest an ordering of real variables, 
then prices, then the federal funds rate. This suggested: employment; hours; real 
consumption of services; real consumption of nondurables; real consumption of 
durables; new single-family home sales; the consumer price index; wages; the 
federal funds rate; the S&P 500 stock index; and The New York Times uncertainty 
measure. This ordering produced generally similar impulse responses to Chart 6: 
The standard error bands continued to straddle zero for most of the horizon, sug-
gesting modestly negative impacts of uncertainty shocks on household purchases. 
Putting the S&P 500 first, followed by The New York Times uncertainty measure, 
followed by the remaining variables in order did not change these results. 
Beaudry and Portier (2006) put the S&P 500 last, suggesting: the New York 
Times uncertainty measure; the federal funds rate; wages; the consumer price 
index; hours worked; the number of employees on nonfarm payrolls; new sin-
gle-family home sales; real consumer spending on durable goods; real consumer 
spending on nondurable goods; real consumer spending on services; and the S&P 
500. In this case, new single-family home sales immediately fall in response to an 
uncertainty shock by a statistically significant amount, but within two months 
the response is once again statistically insignificant; the drop in new home sales 
lasts for four months using stock market volatility as the uncertainty measure. 
The responses of the other series are volatile and modestly negative on net, with 
some statistically significant readings and others that are not.
Another possibility is to run the VARs with the variables in levels (natural 
log levels for all variables other than the uncertainty measure and the federal 
funds rate) rather than transforming them to deviations from trend. Doing so 
did not greatly alter the impulse responses for The New York Times uncertainty 
measure. Once again, the point estimates for the responses all experienced de-
clines. However, the declines were rarely statistically significant. In the VAR using 
(non-detrended) stock market volatility as the uncertainty measure, the point 
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decreased; the increases were statistically significant for the three measures based 
on real consumption.
24This result contrasts with the findings of Romer (1990), who finds that 
stock market volatility is a more significant factor in driving consumer spending 
than the level of the stock market. However, it is worth pointing out that Romer 
defines volatility as a backward-looking measure: It is the average squared monthly 
change in real stock prices over the previous 12 months. This article follows Bloom 
(2009) in defining volatility from stock market options for the post-1986 period 
and the monthly volatility of the S&P 500 index before that period.
25There are other possible uncertainty measures, including Carroll and Dunn’s 
(1997) preferred measure of household uncertainty: the difference between the 
fraction of consumers in the University of Michigan’s survey who thought unem-
ployment would rise over the next 12 months minus the fraction who thought 
unemployment would fall. Using monthly data from January 1978 through Octo-
ber 2010 (this measure was not available on a monthly basis prior to 1978), incor-
porating this measure for uncertainty into the multivariate VAR did not produce 
responses consistent with the real options framework. 
26The measures of uncertainty considered in this article focus on aggregate 
uncertainty. Instead, it is possible that individual households respond using the 
real options framework to their own uncertainty shocks, but these household-level 
uncertainty shocks are not necessarily correlated with aggregate uncertainty.
27Davig and Hakkio (2010) consider a two-regime world that captures the 
essence of this argument, though they do not focus on household purchases. 
28Bloom identifies the uncertainty shocks as discrete events when the detrend-
ed stock market volatility level in a month rose more than 1.65 standard deviations 
above its mean. See the Appendix of Bloom for more details.
29As in Bloom (2009), the VAR includes the following variables, in their Cho-
lesky ordering: S&P 500, uncertainty indicator, federal funds rate, wages in manu-
facturing, consumer price index, hours worked in manufacturing, employment 
in manufacturing, and industrial production in manufacturing. With the excep-
tion of the uncertainty indicator, all other variables enter as deviations from their 
Hodrick-Prescott filtered trends, with smoothing parameter 129,600 for monthly 
data. The data come from the website of Nicholas Bloom; they run from July 1962 
through June 2008.
30All impulse responses in this Appendix are normalized so that the large un-
certainty shock indicator takes on the value of 1 in month 0. This chart is a repro-
duction of Figure 2 in Bloom (2009).
31This chart is a reproduction of Figure 3 in Bloom (2009).
32The 0-1 large uncertainty shock indicator series is not detrended. In the 
baseline model results presented in the charts, all other variables enter the VAR in 
detrended form. 92  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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